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NOTES FOR A DISCUSSION OF MASS TORT CASES
AND CLASS ACTIONS'
Hon. Jack B. Weinsteint
Mass tort cases-such as those resulting from asbestos,
agent orange, breast implants, the dalkon shield, the
polybutane pipe, and heart valves, to name just a few-raise
some tough questions for our society and the legal profession.
The overarching issue is: how can we best protect and
compensate people exposed to toxic substances and dangerous
products-particularly those with latent, after-discovered
dangers-at a reasonable cost, without unnecessarily
destroying industries and unduly deterring development of
new products?
PROTECTIVE APPROACHES
People turn to our state common law of torts, to the
courts, and to federal and state class actions for protection and
compensation, because legislatures and administrative agen-
cies have generally failed to comprehensively and reliably
address the problems.
New Zealand's approach-government guarantees for med-
ical treatment and lost income to those injured-has no chance
of adoption in the United States. Nevertheless, some of our
safety nets, such as social security disability, workers compen-
sation, and limited public medical insurance, help ameliorate
harm and justify some limits on tort compensation, such as
deductions from damage awards for collateral benefits.
Protection by governmental agencies, through an adminis-
trative system of prior product approval and administrative
penalties for lack of compliance, has some merit. Various feder-
©1997 Jack B. Weinstein. All Rights Reserved.
t Senior Judge, United States District Court, Eastern District of New York.
These notes were prepared for a round table discussion of Mass Torts at the
Georgetown University Law Center on November 7, 1996.
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al agencies already have considerable protective responsibility
and power to impose penalties. They include the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the Food and Drug Administration, the
National Institute of Occupational Health and Safety, the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and the Con-
sumer Product Safety Commission.
We lack, however, comprehensive and reliable guarantees
against bureaucratic failures and inadequate legislative appro-
priations which will support timely and comprehensive studies
of causality, as well as risks and benefits.
Evasion of regulations for profit and by reason of negli-
gence on the part of producers are a continuing concern. Addi-
tionally, the public fears that behind-the-scenes political or
private influence will weaken effective regulatory control. How-
ever, administrative protections can be combined with private
recovery to reduce transactional costs.
The alternative generally embraced in the United States is
a tort system that deters misconduct through compensation
after injury. Objections to this system, such as excessive cau-
tion in product development, a lottery-like over-and-under
compensation for some of those injured, and greed-driven fee
excesses of some lawyers, have some basis in fact but are more
often than not exaggerated.
On balance, mass tort class actions, when tightly super-
vised by independent judges, and run by skilled and pragmatic
lawyers, accomplish much more good than harm to society, and
benefit those who have been injured. Even American industry
benefits, because our products are probably somewhat safer
and more acceptable to consumers as a result of the threat of
tort litigation.
The pragmatic American way is to rely upon a combina-
tion of theories and agencies, with modifications to balance the
needs of litigants, commerce, the courts, and our federal politi-
cal system. Within this eclectic system a multitude of narrower
questions remain. I will touch briefly on ten.
[Vol. 63: 581
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1. Preemption
How much shall we leave to state and how much to federal
substantive law? In Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,' a case involving
an allegedly defective pacemaker lead, the Supreme Court
sensibly held that as long as the relevant federal administra-
tive agency (in this instance the Food and Drug Administra-
tion) has not provided for preliminary protection by requiring
adequate testing of the product, and unless Congress specifical-
ly requires otherwise, traditional state tort law, supported by
state and federal class actions, remains the appropriate means
of protecting the public.
2. Science
A continuing problem is how to engage the scientific com-
munity in relevant judicial proceedings. We must increase the
likelihood that court decisions on liability are based on the
appropriate science-based considerations of risk and causation.
The recent Dauberd decision by the Supreme Court, remind-
ing us that judges are gatekeepers protecting litigation against
science-charlatans, has strengthened courts' hands. Judge
Pointer's use of a panel of distinguished neutral scientists
under Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence in the breast
implant cases will give the courts a better grasp of the complex
medical causation issues in those cases. A more important
issue is how we can obtain more help from responsible scien-
tists.
Unresolved problems include: how to pay a Rule 706
expert's fees (in the breast implant cases, there is a grant of
$400,000 from the courts' Administrative Office); how such
experts can be prepared for depositions (by definition they are
naive about the legal system and have no sponsoring counsel);
and how their reports can be used at trial in a way that does
not unduly burden them with repeated court appearances,
while still protecting the due process of the litigants. Should
the jury even be told that they are court appointed?3
1 116 S. Ct. 2240 (1996).
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
See, e.g., 4 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEMNSTEN'S EVI-
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3. Settlements: Future Claimants
Shall those who will not discover their injuries until the
future be bound by a settlement? Can we avoid the serious
ethical conflicts that arise in attempting to represent thou-
sands of current clients while simultaneously providing for the
claims of future unknown claimants? How can we guarantee
that enough money will be available in the future to pay ap-
propriate claims? Can alternative dispute resolution techniques
be utilized in order to cut litigation and fund distribution
costs?
Industry needs to buy peace from long, drawn-out, debili-
tating legal conflicts. An early and sound settlement of a class
action is often the best way to protect everyone.
Rhone-Poulenc4 constituted, in the opinion of many, a
somewhat cruel and unnecessary inhibition imposed by one
appellate court upon an attempt to settle the almost intrac-
table HIV hemophiliac tragedy. Despite the Rhone-Poulenc
decision, the matter is settled anyway, all over the world.5
The Ninth Circuit, in Valentino v. Carter-Wallace Inc.,6
has cast doubt on Rhone-Poulenc, stating "the law of this cir-
cuit... has not looked'favorably upon granting extraordinary
relief to vacate a class certification."7 It pointed to current
proposals to amend Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure in order to encourage settlements to support its reluc-
tance "to close the door" on product liability class actions.8
Yet proposals by the Civil Rules Committee to amend Rule
23 to permit settlement class actions under strict court control
have only modest merit. The only proposal of substance-to
permit interlocutory appeals-can only slow up and complicate
DENCE 706[03] (J. McLaughlin ed., 1996).
Matter of Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. de-
nied, 116 S. Ct. 184 (1995).
' See, e.g., Anthony De Palma, Canadian Study Says Tainted Blood Victims
Deserve Payment, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1997, at A15; 455 Hemophiliacs Settle
ADS Suit, L.A. T IES, Mar. 21, 1996, at 4.
a 97 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 1996).
7 Id. at 1232.
8 Id. at 1233.
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expeditious and fair settlements. The intermediate appellate
courts are not generally helpful in micromanaging these com-
plex cases.
Present Rule 23 can do the job. The means are already
there: subclassing and court appointment of independent coun-
sel to represent future claimants and other unrepresented
subclasses; close control by the judge assigned to the case cou-
pled with the power to require modification of settlement de-
tails; and strict monitoring of fees and lawyers' relations with
huge numbers of clients.9
The problems posed by settlements of massive class ac-
tions were partially addressed by the Supreme Court in
Amchem Products,"° an asbestos case. Justice Ginsburg, writ-
ing for the majority, advocated a rather strict adherence to the
terms of Rule 23, while allowing consideration of a settlement
in deciding on certification. More reflective of the equitable and
pragmatic spirit of Rule 23 was Justice Breyer's minority
opinion, allowing the trial judge to give more weight to a set-
tlement in determining whether common issues predominate.
This more closely corresponds with the notion that Rule 23
was intended to be flexible, a tool for lawyers and judges to
resolve complex, mass litigation problems in a fair, efficient,
and expeditious manner. The full meaning of Amchem will
need to be spelled out over the years in many complex litiga-
tions, but it has, temporarily at least, put a damper on settle-
ment class actions.
I have little doubt that a global settlement or series of
class action settlements, providing for matrix payments on the
current Manville plan," but at nearly full value, is desirable.
The problem is primarily the conflicts of interest that exist for
plaintiffs' attorneys. The ethicists who see no evil at all in
some of these sweetheart deals have a higher tolerance than I.
' See generally JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MAsS TORT LITIGA-
TION: THE EFFECT OF CLASS ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS, AND OTHER MULTIPArIM
DEVICES (1996).
"0 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct 2231 (1997).
" See, e.g., In re Joint Eastern and Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig. (Johns-
Manville Corp.), 129 B.&. 710 (E.D.N.Y. & S.D.N.Y. 1991), vacated on other
grounds, 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1992).
1997]
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Ethics cannot be abandoned in the chase for big bucks. In
mass torts we are just beginning to come to grips with this
dilemma.'2
4. Integration of Criminal, Administrative, and Civil
Litigations
One issue that is just beginning to gain attention is the
integration of restitution orders in criminal cases and recover-
ies in parallel civil cases. Congress and the courts are now
stressing restitution to victims as an additional remedy to be
imposed on the criminally guilty.
For example, in a recent massive fraud, fleecing hundreds
of poor Chinese immigrants, the defendant was prosecuted
criminally in United States v. Hollman Cheung,2 while simul-
taneously, some 100 of the victims were joined as plaintiffs in
a civil suit. 4 One judge was assigned to both the civil and
criminal case. In negotiations conducted with assistance from
the magistrate judge, and with public fairness hearings by the
court, an integrated settlement of the civil case and criminal
case developed. Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the sentencing judge did not participate in
any criminal plea agreement negotiations."
The private plaintiffs' attorneys fees were approved by the
court in Cheung. The defendant was left destitute but with a
reduced prison term. He cooperated with the FBI, the United
States Attorney, and the lawyer representing him in both the
civil and criminal case to locate all the victims.1" The public
hearing at which the victims expressed their hurt was reveal-
ing. As in the case of litigations like asbestos, agent orange or
DES, seeing the suffering victims first hand made it clear that
they should not go remediless under our legal system.
1 WEINSTEIN, supra note 9, at 79-83.
13 952 F. Supp. 148 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
l' Lang Fang Chau v. Hollman Cheung, 952 F. Supp. 148 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
16 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(1)(c) ("The court shall not participate in any such
discussions" of possible plea agreements).
1" Cheung, 952 F. Supp. at 149; see also United States v. Ferranti, 928 F.
Supp. 206 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); United States v. Malpeso, 943 F. Supp. 254 (E.D.N.Y.
1996); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663, 3664 (1994).
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Cooperation in parallel criminal and civil cases-based
partly on the French system--can be broadened. For example,
if the SEC is going to fine a potential civil defendant, can that
procedure be integrated with a class action to compensate the
victims so we can avoid the present two-tiered expensive prose-
cutions (i.e., one administrative and one as a private class
action using information revealed in the SEC prosecution)?
Similarly, where the government fines a defendant, as it did
recently in the antitrust criminal case settled against Archer
Daniels Midland Co. for $100,000,000,'1 an additional settled
amount might compensate victims with a cause of action to
stave off more civil litigation. 8 Power to fine for the violation
of regulations governing the manufacture and sale of automo-
biles, drugs, toys and other consumer goods could provide room
for integrating some private and public litigations. The govern-
ment itself is often partly at fault and should contribute to the
settlement in cases such as agent orange."
One of the benefits of our combined state and federal regu-
latory-private tort systems is that they ask how we can better
compensate and protect without wrecking our current commer-
cial and legal institutions. The practical and practicable, rather
than the ideological, rule the day in class actions.
Observing from the neutral position of a judge, given the
huge complex problems to be solved, on balance, our legal sys-
tem does a fairly credible job in protecting the public and de-
fendants. We ought not to remove that protection or unduly
hobble the legal system by inhibiting civil suits unless we are
willing to pay the costs of greater administrative controls. We
do not know quite where the developing law of restitution or
administrative control will go. We do know that in our complex
legal-political system, pragmatic, better ways will be devised to
meet the problem of mass tort actions.
17 Kurt Eichenwald, Archer Daniels Agrees to Big Fine for Price Fixing, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 15, 1996, at A6.
Settlement in Archer Daniels Case Approved, N.Y. TILES, Apr. 12, 1997, at
Al.
19 See., e.g., David White, Compensation Bill Doubled, FINANCIAL. TIMES, Oct. 4,
1997, at 2 (Spanish government fined to compensate victims of cooking oil poison-
ing); NATIONAL VETERANS LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM, THE VETERANS SELF-HELP
GUIDE ON AGENT ORANGE (1995) (government programs supplementing programs
resulting from private litigation against manufacturers).
1997]
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5. Alternate Dispute Resolution
Much can be done outside of court by voluntary coopera-
tion. For example, an American Arbitration Association Com-
mittee under Kenneth Feinberg's chairmanship, has developed
guidelines for use of alternative dispute settlement techniques
from pre- to post-judgment in mass torts to avoid and reduce
the costs of litigation.0
6. Integration of Federal and State Court Systems
How can we better integrate our state and federal court
systems? There is now some vying for control with a race to
one courthouse or another for perceived advantages in class
and other actions. In Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Ep-
stein,2 a state court settlement of a class action released all
claims, federal and state, throughout the nation. The Supreme
Court approved on full faith and credit grounds.
The American Law Institute has suggested a joint federal-
state procedure patterned on the federal multidistrict panel
technique of concentrating federal cases before one judge for
pretrial control.2 The conflict of laws problems are acute, but
resolvable.
A good deal of cooperation among judges through tele-
phones and joint meetings is already developing." Recently,
for example, four judges sat on the same bench-one state
judge charged with coordination of all New York breast im-
plant cases, two federal trial judges from the Eastern and
Southern Districts of New York charged with all such cases in
their districts, and an Eastern District magistrate judge to
hear prospective scientific evidence and decide which experts
could testify and how the issues were to be tried.'
20 See AMERICAN ARBITRATION'ASSOCIATION, RECOMiENDATIONS OF TASK FORCE
ON ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND MASS TORTS (1997).
21 116 S. Ct. 873 (1996).
2See THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, COMPLEX LITIGATION: STATUTORY RECOM-
MENDATIONS AND ANALYSIS (1994).
' See, for example, the private meetings of the Mass Tort Litigation Commit-
tee of state and federal judges with off-the-record discussions on case coordination,
particularly in the asbestos, breast implant, and new arrivals on the mass tort
scene. Reports and letters in private file of author.
2 See In re Breast Implant Cases, 942 F. Supp. 958, 959-60 (E.D.N.Y. &
[Vol. 63:681
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We have not fully appreciated the possibility of removal
from state to federal courts and consolidation by
multidistricting provided by the supplemental jurisdiction of
the recently amended section 1367 of Title 28 of the United
State Code. The power to grant stays to avoid court conflicts
and to protect jurisdiction needs further exploration.'
7. Modern Technology
We have not fully adopted modern technology such as
video cassettes, satellite beamed conferences, online informa-
tion, CD-ROM and computers to avoid the duplication of effort
and to keep attorneys and their clients in touch with each
other and the courts. Some of the traditional advantages of
close one-on-one client-attorney-court relationships can be
preserved while large numbers of litigants are protected at one
time.
8. Partial Compensation as Needed
We have not explored fully the possibility of compensating
people who need immediate medical help while waiting for
science to provide a fuller analysis of risks and dangers. For
example, the Pfizer heart valve settlement provided for pay-
ment of costs, surgery and compensation as needed.'
In the New York breast implant cases we are trying dam-
ages separately from local injuries caused by defective breast
implants, while putting off the more dubious systematic injury
matters until the Rule 706 panel reports are issuedY
S.D.N.Y. 1996).
' See Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1994) (stay of state court proceed-
ings); cf In re Eastern and Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig. (7n re Eagle-Pitcher),
134 F.RID. 32, 36-37 (E.D.N.Y. & S.D.N.Y. 1990); In re Joint Eastern and South-
ern Dists. Asbestos Litig. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 120 131L 648, 654-59
(E.D.N.Y. & S.D.N.Y. 1990); see also In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 996
F.2d 1245, 1431 (2d Cir. 1993) ("A district court, in exceptional circumstances, may
use its All Writs authority to remove an otherwise unremovable state court case
in order to 'effectuate and prevent the frustration of orders it has previously is-
sued in its exercise of jurisdiction otherwise obtained.'!) (citation omitted).
' ilt Freudenheim, Settlement Approved on Pfizer Heart Values, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 20, 1992, at 4.
2' In re Breast Implant Cases, 942 F. Supp. 958 (E.D.N.Y. & S.D.N.Y. 1996);
cf Bucldey v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 79 F.3d 1337, cert. granted, 117 S. Ct.
1997/]
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9. Early Consideration of Merits
The scope of authority possessed by courts to consider the
merits of the case and the needs of the parties early on in
deciding how far class actions and other mass litigations will
be permitted to go is just beginning to develop. Supreme Court
dictum in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin" has unnecessarily
limited court discretion to consider the merits in deciding on
class certification. Evaluation of the merits controls our tactics
at every phase of a litigation. Tying the courts' hands by pre-
venting early protection of the parties and the public is not
appropriate in mass tort class actions. Moreover, it is inappro-
priate to limit the courts' power to suggest modifications of
settlements after fairness hearings in order to fine tune a
settlement to better protect potential claimants and the pub-
lic."
10. Integration of Bankruptcies and Other Litigations
How bankruptcy can be avoided while utilizing some of its
procedural and other protections needs further thought. Treat-
ing the same problems in many uncoordinated bankruptcy
courts with ongoing litigations in other courts is unduly waste-
ful of resources. Why, for example, should we have so many
separate asbestos-related bankruptcy funds being separately
administered by separate trusts with so many overlapping
claimants?
CONCLUSION
Our dynamic, free society constantly presents new, chal-
lenges. While the problems are immense, so too are our re-
sources in skilled lawyers, sensible laypersons, dedicated judg-
379 (1996) (emotional distress actionable under Federal Employers' Liability Act
where employee was exposed to asbestos but had not yet shown symptoms and
cost of medical monitoring recoverable). The New York breast implant cases were
being settled after a trial of eleven claims based on local injuries alone. N.Y.L.J.,
Nov. 28, 1997, at 1.
28 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
29 Jack B. Weinstein & Karin S. Schwartz, Notes from the Cave: Some Prob-
lems of Judges in Dealing With Class Action Settlements, 163 F.R.D. 369 (1995).
[Vol. 63:681
19971 MASS TORT AND CLASS ACTIONS 591
es and new technology. Using present institutions and proce-
dures, we can provide reasonable protections against mass
disasters while providing acceptable compensation at reason-
able costs when people are injured. Our system works relative-
ly well. Nevertheless, we can do better.

